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ARTICLE
IT IS TIME TO REEVALUATE THE TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY
Susan E. Dudley*
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1986. on the heels of the deadi\ chemical release in Bhopal. India. Congress directed the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA-) to begin requiring certain industries to report on the presence and
release of certain toxic chemicals on an annual basis.' The EPA considers this "Community Right-to-Know"
program to be "among its most effective strategies for improving environmental performance," 2 and it has
expanded its scope significantly over the last sixteen years.' Through regulation, the EPA has increased the
number of industries required to report under the Toxic Chemical Release Inventory ("TRI") by 30 percent, and
more than doubled the number of chemicals covered. In 1999. the Agency increased the required number of
TRI reports for chemicals that persist and bioaccumulate in the environment' and has considered expanding the
required reporting further to include chemical use (tracking and reporting the amounts of chemicals moving
through a facility). as well as chemical release." On January 17. 2001. the EPA lowered the reporting thresholds
for lead and lead compounds from 25.000 lbs to 100 lbs.'
However. despite the EPA's enthusiasm for Community Right-to-Know. and its claims about the
"success of the Right-to-Know\ programs.^" it has not offered a thoughtful examination of the real impacts of the
TRI program. The EPA has neither provided an objective account of the validity or usefulness of the
information the program collects and disseminates. nor has it evaluated how well the TRI accomplishes the
EPA's goals ol' protecting public health and the environment from chemical hazards. Perhaps more importantly
in the "post- 9 1 I w\orld.- the EPA has not addressed the dangers of making chemical risk information broadly
available to potential terrorists. In 2004. nearly twenty years after the Bhopal disaster, Americans face a new
chemical threat. Terrorists have attacked on American soil. and have indicated an interest in using chemical
and biological warfare against civilians. The information made public by the TRI may facilitate a terrorist
network intent on causing a new chemical tragedv.
Particularly in light of this new threat. the EPA should thoughtfully examine its TRI program.
Seventeen years after the Iirst'reports wNere required. it is time the EPA (1) reviewed the goals of the program,
Director. ReulIatori Studies Prouram. Nercatus Center at Georee Mason University. Cindy Goh and John Shoaf provided valuable
editorial and research assistance.
SEmeruenci Planning and Communiiti Riuht-to-Know% Act ("EPCRA"). 42 U.S.C. §§ I1001-11050 (2000).
- EPA. TRI-Phase 3: Expansion of the EP.4 CnnununitY Righi-to-Knoiw Program to Increase the Information Available to the Public
,n Chemical Ise [hereinafter Exp4ansi)n of (onunit Righi-io-Know]. at http:/'www.epa.gov/tri/programs/trip3v6.htm (last updated
lar. 2. 2004). The EPA notes on its website that this information. while accurate when first created, is now outdated. Id.
See ini-a Part 11.
Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals. 64 Fed. Reg. 58.666 (Oct. 29. 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
EPA. Expansion of lhe Toxics Release Inveniorv (TRI) to Gather Chemical Use Information: TRI-Phase 3: Use Expansion
[hereinafter Evpansion o/ TRI]. at http: wwwv.epa.gov'tri'programs'p3ip94.htm (last updated Mar. 2, 2004). The EPA notes on its
web site that this information. while accurate when first created, is now outdated. Id.
Lead and Lead Compounds. 66 Fed. Reg. 4.500 (Jan. 17. 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
The EPA seyenth Loal in its 1997-2002 Strategic Plan was -Expansion of Americans' Right to Know About Their Environment."
EPA. 1997-2002 Sni I(l, PI \\ 50(1997). available at http:,'/%ww.epa.gov/ocfo/plan/epastrat.pdf.
11.
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(2) evaluated how well TRI has achieved those goals. and (3) looked ahead at what future course would best
meet its goals of protecting public health and the environment from chemical hazards.
This article offers some insights for that examination. It begins with a review of the enabling legislation
and the implementing regulations. including the most recent regulations governing the reporting of persistent
bioaccumulative toxics and lead compounds. Then it considers the rationale for the TRI and examines whether
the EPA's economic arguments justifying its expansions of the inventory are adequate. The article then
evaluates whether the TRI in fact meets the purposes the EPA and others have identified for it: to provide
useful information to communities and to reduce pollution. The article linds that the EPA's goals for the TRI
are not adequately linked to health and the environment, that the TRI does not achieve its stated goals. and that
the benefits of the recent expansions of the TRI are not commensurate with the costs. The article concludes
with recommendations for making the TRI program more effective.
i. COMMUNITY-RIGHT-To-KNo\w REGULATORY I liSTORY
In the wake of the catastrophic release of methyl isocyanate from a chemical plant in Bhopal. India.
which killed thousands of people. and a subsequent serious. though not deadly. chemical release at a plant in
West Virginia, Congress enacted the Emergency Planning and Community Richt-to-Know Act of 1986
("EPCRA").
Section 312 of the EPCRA requires certain facilities to submit an annual inventory of the designated
hazardous chemicals present at the facility.'' Section 313 requires certain facilities that manufacture. process. or
otherwise use more than a threshold amount of any listed "toxic chemical" to submit to both the EPA and the
state in which the facility is located, a Toxic Chemical Release Inventory Report (Form R) for that chemical
each year.12 The Form R must identify the quantity of the listed chemical that is **released" to the
environment.13 With the passage of the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (*PPA-). the definition of --release"
was broadened to include TRI chemicals that were recycled or treated. as \\ell as those that were transferred off-
site as waste or routinely or accidentally released on-site into the air. land or water.14
Since passage of the Act. the EPA has added over 300 chemicals to the list of toxic chemicals subject to
the TRI. In 1997, the EPA expanded the coverage of the TRI to encompass approximately 6.000 facilities in
six additional industry sectors, including: mining. electric power generation. hazardous waste disposal. chemical
distribution,. petroleum wholesale, and solvent recovery.
In 1993, the EPA initiated a "TRI-Phase 3" project to expand the TRI to include not only data on the
presence or release of chemicals at facilities. but also data on the use and movement of chemicals within the
facility.' 7 The EPA issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking in September 1996.1' along with an
issue paper that stated. "[t]he Agency finds that materials accounting. which is a method for tracking the
amounts of toxic chemicals moving through a facility. has promise for tilling in Right-to-Know gaps that have




4 Pollution Prevention Act of 1990.42 U.S.C. § 13101-13109.
s EPA, Changes to the TRI List of Toxic Chemicals f198"-00/. availahl at htp: wint\%.epa.got tri chemical cheilistchanges02.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5. 2004).
16 Addition of Facilities in Certain Sectors. 62 Fed. Re,-. 23.834 (Ma\ I. 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
n Expansion ofTRL supra note 5.
8 EPA. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Sept. 25. 1996). available at ivw.epa.gov tri programs anprpre.htm (last updated
Mar. 2, 2004).
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been identified in the present TRI data."l 9 While the EPA has not issued any statements formally abandoning
this "materials accounting" expansion, there appears to be no activity underway to pursue it.20
Former Vice President Al Gore announced the Chemical Right-to-Know ("ChemRTK") Initiative on
Earth Day in 1998.21 This effort to increase the public availability of information on the toxicity of high
production volume ("HPV") commercial chemicals encourages voluntary efforts by companies to test the
toxicity of the chemicals they produce. 22 The Vice President also announced two forthcoming rulemakings: (1)
a Children's Health Test Rule, which would subject HPV chemicals of particular concern to children's health to
more detailed and extensive testing; and (2) an expansion of the TRI to focus more attention on toxic chemicals
that persist and bioaccumulate in the environment.2 3
The Children's Health Test Rule has remained a voluntary evaluation program. However, a rule was
issued in October 1999 to expand the TRI.25 Among other things, the rule added several persistent
bioaccumulative toxic ("PBT") chemicals to the list of chemicals that must be reported. eliminated options for
streamlined reporting of PBT chemicals, and significantly lowered reporting thresholds for PBT chemicals. 26
PBT chemicals are chemicals that exist in the environment for a certain length of time (persist) before they are
eliminated or transformed by natural processes.27 While Congress set default reporting thresholds at 25.000
pounds for chemicals that are "manufactured" or "processed," and 10.000 pounds for chemicals that are
"otherwise used," the 1999 rule lowered those to 0.1 grams for dioxin and dioxin-like compounds, 10 pounds
for "highly persistent and highly bioaccumulative" chemicals, and 100 pounds for other PBT chemicals.
The EPA classified lead and lead compounds as PBT chemicals in January 2001 .29 This final rule
lowered the reporting threshold for lead and lead compounds from 25,000 pounds to 100 pounds, which greatly
increased the number of facilities reporting and the number of reports in the TRI, because of the ubiquity of low
levels of lead in manufactured products. 30
Ill. THE RATIONALE FOR THE TRI
According to the EPA's TRI fact sheet for the public, 'EPCRA's primary purpose is to inform
communities and citizens of chemical hazards in their areas." 3' The EPA's press information on the report
observes:
19 Expansion ofCommunity Right-to-Know, supra note 2.20 While information on Phase 3 is available on the EPA's web site. the Agency disclaims that the information is outdated. EPA.
Program Development, available at http://www.epa.gov/tri/programs/program.htm (last updated Mar. 2. 2004).
2 Press Release, EPA, EPA to Expand Chemical Right-to-Know Program and Provide Public with Better Health Data (Apr. 21. 1998)[hereinafter EPA Press Release], available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/earthday/09.htm.
22 EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. Voluntary Participation in the HPV Challenge Program. EPA 745-F-98-002b. at I(July 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/chenirtk/hpvvol2.pdf.
23 EPA Press Release, supra note 2 1.
24 EPA, Voluntary Children's Chemical Evaluation Program (VCCEP). available at http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk'vccep'index.htm
(last updated Sept 28, 2004).
25 Persistent Bioaccumulative (PBT) Chemicals. 64 Fed. Reg. 58.666. (Oct. 29. 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
2 6 Id.
27 Id. at 58,668. -Bioaccumulation is a general term that is used to describe the process by which organisms may accumulate chemical
substances in their bodies. The tern refers to both uptake of chemicals from water (bioconcentration) and from ingested food and
sediment residues ' Id. at 58,669.
28 Id. at 58,669-70.
29 Lead and Lead Compounds. 66 Fed. Reg. 4.500. 4.503-04 (Jan. 17. 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
30 Id. at 4,530.
3' EPA, What is the Toxic Release Inveniory ITRI) Program. available at http://www.epa.gov/tri'whatis.htni (last updated June 14.
2004).
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The TRI Program has been a tremendously successful program. The industries that have
reported to TRI since its inception have reduced their on- and off-site releases of TRI chemicals
by 54.5 percent or 1.72 billion pounds (for chemicals reportable in all years). Governments -
federal. state. and local - have used TRI to set priorities, measure progress, and target areas of
special and immediate concern. The public has used the TRI data to understand their local
environment, to participate in local and national debates about the choices being made that may
affect their health and the health of their children and., ultimately, to exert their influence on the
outcome of these debates. 32
Informing the public about hazards in their community is an intuitively desirable social goal. Without
knowledge of the likelihood of exposure to health hazards. families may pay more than they would otherwise to
live in certain areas. or might take fewer precautions than they would with more information.33 However, this
does not establish that any information on chemical releases is desirable. The fundamental questions of what
information will enhance the public's understanding of the risks they face, how much of it should be released,
and to iwhom. must be directly addressed. To address these questions, it is important to recognize that
information is costly to produce. and depending on how it is communicated and received, may confuse, rather
than inform.34 Even if we determine that information on the release of certain chemicals has a net social value,
we cannot assume that more frequently reported information, or information on a broader range of chemicals
wNould be more valuable.3 Only when the social costs of information are weighed against the social benefits
can a determination be made regarding what and how much information is optimal.36
The EPA's set of goals for TRI is a largely missing a discussion of the goal of protecting public health
and the environment. The EPA appears to assume, without justification, that these fundamental goals of the
37Agency will be accomplished as a result of TRI's primary goals. Particularly since the catalyst for the
EPCRA was the deadly chemical accident in Bhopal, it is disconcerting that the focus of TRI has become so
detached from any assessment of risks to health or the environment. In the PBT rule, for example, the EPA
rejected a risk-based metric for reporting dioxin-like compounds in favor of its preferred weight-based option.39
The EPA chose this approach despite the fact that the agency admitted that its preferred option would not allow
communities to evaluate potential risks of releases from dioxin-like compounds.40
EPA. The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and Factors to Consider When Using TRI Data, at 1, available at
http: \ ww.epa.gov/tri/tridata/tri0 I /press/FactorsToConPDF.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
See W. Kip Viscusi. .Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 Econ. J. 1657, 1657 (1997) ("Increased knowledge
about the risks we face will enable us to make sounder decisions and increase our expected utility judged on the basis of the true
rrobabilities.").Recent empirical analysis reveals that individuals do not respond rationally to diverse information on risks, weighting opinions that
suggested high risk much greater than opinions that evaluated a risk as lower, regardless of the source of those opinions (government,
non-profit. or industry). See general/v id.
When more information is available. some of it will inevitably be conflicting and thus confusing to the general public. See id. at
1658.
3 For a good discussion of the optimal level of information in product markets, see Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of
Consumer Information. 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 533-34 (1981).
37 According to its most recent strategic plan, the EPA's mission is "to protect human health and the environment." EPA, 2003-2008
EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 2 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/plan/2003sp.pdf.
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know, Pub. L. 99-499, 1000 Stat. 1728 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-05,
11021-23, 11041-50 (2000)).
19 Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,666, 58,692-95 (Oct. 29, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
372).
4 Id. at 58.692-95.
4
MELPR, Vol. 12, No. I
It is unclear how information on the pounds of certain chemicals emitted from facilities, even if it were
perfectly accurate. advances an individual's knowledge of the potential risks he faces by living near those
facilities. Consider the alarm that might be engendered by the revelation that a plant near one's home emits
quantities of the following toxic. and potentially carcinogenic, chemicals: acetaldehyde, benzaldehyde, caffeic
acid. d-limonene. estragole. and quercetin glycosides. Informed citizens might demand that the facility
minimize or prevent the use and release of these chemicals. In fact. these chemicals occur naturally and are
41likely to be found on a fresh fruit platter of apples. pears. grapes. and mangos.
A. Cols and Benefits of TRI
Reg.ulatory actions are unlikely to make people better off unless they are designed to remedy a
siiniticant market failure. As the EPA noted in the preamble to the PBT rule, two possible causes of market
failure are externalities and information asvmmetries..' It justified TRI reporting requirements based on the
need to correct a ",failure" of the market to provide adequate information to the public about the use and release
of chemicals." However. this analysis is superficial and neglects the key questions of what information and
howI much of it is optimal.
Information is a good. and like other goods. it is costly to produce.4 5 Markets generally function well at
determining the optimal level of production for different goods. including information.46 Absent some market
failure that results in a sub-optimal production of information. a federal mandate requiring the production of
information is likely to divert scarce resources from other. more valued. social goals such as research and
development. health care and education.'4
For both the final lead and PBT rules. the EPA relies on market failure arguments:
Tw\o causes of market failure are externalities and information asymmetries. In the case of
negative externalities, the actions of one economic entity impose costs on parties that are
.. external" to an\ market transaction. For example. a facility may release toxic chemicals
Without accointing for the consequences to other parties. such as the surrounding community,
and the facility's decisions will fail to reflect those costs. The market may also fail to efficiently
allocate resources in cases where consumers lack information. For example, where information
is insufficient regarding toxic releases. individuals' choices regarding where to live and work
may not be the same as if they had more complete information. Since firms ordinarily have little
or no incentive to provide information on their releases and other waste management activities
It See. e.g.. American Council on Science & Health. ACSH Holida Dinner ./enu 2004 (Oct. 12. 2004), available at
http: %\ivi.acsh.ory publications publD.103 pub detail.asp (last visited Nov. 3. 2004).
" An Executi\e Order from President Clinton states that -Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by
la\\. are necessary to interpret the law. or are made necessary by compelling need. such as material failures of private markets to
protect or improve the health and safety of the public. the environment. or the well being of the American people . . . ." Exec. Order
No. 12.866. 58 Fed. Reg. 51.735 (Sept. 30. 1993).
' PBT Chemicals. 64 Fed. Re,. at 58.740.
I.
45 Beales et al.. supra note 36. at 503. See also Alexander Volokh. et al.. Environmental Information: The Toxics Release Inventory,
Stakeholder Participation, and the Right io Know. Part / of12: Shortcomings of the Current Right-to-Know, REASON PUBLIC POLICY
INSTn V: In. PoLicY Si DY No. 247 (Dec. 1998). available at wvviv.rppi.org!ps246.html.
'" See Beales et al.. supra note 36. at 503.
n1 Volokh. et al..ssupra note 45.
5
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involving toxic chemicals. the market fails to allocate society's resources in the most efficient
manner. 48
To a limited extent, some economists have accepted this notion. For example. Tietenberg and Wheeler
argue:
Information about environmental risks is asymmetrically distributed. In a typical case the best knowledge
about emission profiles is held by the polluters and/or regulators. not the victims. Furthermore the polluters
are unlikely to share the information with victims in the absence of outside pressure to do So.
These analyses suffer from several failings. First. these analyses assume the toxic release retlects an
external cost, when, in fact, the chemicals reported under TRI are all subject to numerous environmental and
occupational regulations designed to internalize the social costs associated with release."' With the exception of
accidental releases (which are less than 0.1 percent of reported releases and are reported elsewhere). reported
TRI releases are routine emissions allowed by laws and regulations. Indeed. many TRI-reported ''releases'
reflect recycling. 52
Second, these analyses fail to recognize that information on releases is available through other sources.
Companies must have operating permits on file with state and federal authorities specifying permitted releases
to air and water.53 For non-permitted releases. the Emergency Response Notification System. accessible on the
Internet, reports notifications of spills and releases of oil and hazardous substances.)
A third failing is that these analyses focus on information about environmental release. rather than the
underlying concern of environmental risk itself. While it may be accurate that *polluters" are unlikely to share
information on releases with "victims" unless required to do so. it is not accurate to assume that "polluters" do
not have adequate incentives to reduce risks to potential "victims.-'; In the event of a release that harmed
public health or the environment, the U.S. regulatory and legal system w\ould certainly impose large costs on the
perpetrator of the harm. This potential liability and damage to a company s reputation provides strong
incentives to minimize potential releases that could affect public health and the environment)
48 The same language appears in both the final PBT and the final lead rule. PBT Chemicals. 64 Fed. Reg. at 58.666. 58.740: Lead and
Lead Compounds, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,499. 4.500 (Jan. 17. 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
4 Tom Tietenberg & David Wheeler. Empowering The Comninitv: Information Strateies For Pollution Control. Presented at the
Frontiers of Environmental Economics Conference. at 1 I (Oct. 23-25. 1998) (emphasis added). available at
http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/workpaper/ecoenv/confpap.pdf.
s0 It is widely recognized in economics that the --optimal" level of pollution is not necessarily zero. The classic works on the concept
of environmental externalities is Ronald H. Coase. The Problem of.Social Cost. J.L & Em \. I (1960).
5I For example, the Clean Air Act. the Safe Drinking Water Act. the Clean Water Act. the Toxic Substances Control Act. and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act all regulate chemicals and their releases into ditlerent media.
12 Volokh, et al., supra note 45.
5 For a description of federal and state permits. see EPA. Basic Facis. available at http: \%1ww.epa.gov air oaqps'permits/ (last
updated Mar. 19, 2003). See also Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2000).
s. The Emergency Response Notification System ("ERNS-) contains release information that is required inder several federal statutes
including CERCLA, EPCRA, and the Hazardous Material Transportation Act of 1974 (-HMTA-). See generally ERNS. available at.
http://www.nrc.uscg.millindex.htmi (last visited Nov. 3. 2004).
5 Roger E. Meiners and Bruce Yandle. The Common Law: How I Protects the Environment. PERC Policy Series. No. PS-13 (Jane S.
Shaw ed., May 1998), available at http://www.perc.org!publications/policyseries.coi monlawfull.php.
"Industrial accidents, aside from potentially harming a communit\. also represent financial losses for the.companies involved.-
Volokh, et al.. Environmental Information: The Taxics Release Inventory. Stakeholder Participation. and the Right to Know. Part 2 of
2: Nonregulatory Options for Environmental Information and .lanagemnent (Dec. 1998). at wwww.rppi.org. ps247.html.
5 See Viscusi, et al., EcONOMICs OF REGULATION AN) ANTITRUST 747 (3d ed. 2001).
6
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Furthermore, the emphasis on providing information to communities assumes rational behavior on the
part of the information recipients. Even if the TRI conveyed important information on potential risk, the
recipients of the information may not interpret it correctly or rationally. Viscusi, in an empirical paper that won
the Royal Economic Society Prize for 1997, found that individuals' responses to divergent risk information
revealed "extreme violations of rationality," as individuals place "inordinate weight on the high risk
assessment."5 He concluded, "these results do not provide great comfort to economists who hypothesize that
decisions will become more rational as we acquire more information to make these decisions."59 .
Finally, the EPA's analysis neglects the fact that public availability of business information has its own
associated risks.60 The wide release of private business information makes it available to competitors and
potential terrorists, as well as communities.61  Before the EPA further expands the number of facilities or
chemicals covered, or requires more extensive information on the flow of chemicals through a facility. it should
consider the possible negative consequences of the misuse of this information and weigh those costs against the
benefits.
1. What are the benefits of TRI?
Despite almost twenty years of experience, the EPA has never attempted to quantify the benefits of TRI.
Rather, in its most recent rulemakings expanding TRI coverage of persistent bioaccumulative toxic (-PBT-)
chemicals, the EPA suggests benefits accrue because the information it requires "may facilitate constructive
activities that internalize the negative externality by bringing the marginal social cost curve and the marginal
private cost curves closer together." 62 As noted above, this presumes, without any analysis or evidence. that
despite all the regulations and liability in place, there are still negative externalities associated with TRI
chemical releases. Moreover, the discussion of benefits does not recognize that the "constructive activities" the
information facilitates also involve costs, and those costs may well exceed the benefits of the activities. In fact.
once these social costs are considered, all of the "benefits" discussed in the economic analysis supporting the
PBT rule could represent net social costs, rather than net social benefits. Without a more objective and
thorough analysis, one cannot determine whether the net social impact of TRI is positive or negative.
For example, the preamble to the January 1999 PBT proposal stated. "if publication of PBT chemical
information leads to reductions in pollution, this generates 'external' benefits." 6 3 In other words. benefits would
not only accrue to the group that lobbied for the pollution reductions. but to other members of the community as
well. However, this would only be true on net if the external benefits of the reductions exceeded the external
costs. These costs could take the form of higher prices for goods and services, or increased health and
ecological risks from substitute chemicals or processes necessitated by the reduction in the TRI chemical.
In listing specific benefits of TRI information, the EPA cites use of the data by community and public
interest groups to educate the public and exert pressure on companies to reduce emissions." However, the
examples it presents include reports with titles such as: "Manufacturing Pollution-: "Poisons in Our
Neighborhoods"; "Troubled Waters: Major Sources of Toxic Water Pollution": "Where the Wastes Are": and
s Viscusi, supra note 33, at 1657.
5 Id. at 1670.
60 Volokh. et al., supra note 45.
61 Angela Logomasini, When Terrorists Have a 'Right To Know.' Tili. BUCKS COuNTRY COURIER TIMEs. Feb. I1. 2002. available at
http://www.cei.org/gencon/019.02387.cfm.
62 EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. Economic Analvsis of the Final Rule to Modify Reporting of Persistent
Bioaccumulative Toxic Chemicals Under EPCRA Section 313 6-5 (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter Economic Analysis]. available at
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/economics/docs/eapbtfnl.pdf.
6 Id. at 6-11.
64 Id. at 6-19.
7
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-Toxic Hot Spots."6 These reports may serve more to frighten than to educate.6 6 Whether such efforts provide
net social benefits depends. in large part. on whether the alarm they generate is worthy of the risks they seek to
mitigate. or whether it causes unnecessary fear and non-productive actions.67 A classic example of the misuse
of information to alarm consumers and incite unnecessary actions was the Alar scare of 1989.68 As the
American Medical Association stated in February 1992: "The Alar scare of three years ago shows what can
happen when science is taken out of context or the risks of a product are blown out of proportion." 69 When used
in the approved. regulated fashion., as it was. Alar does not pose a risk to the public's health.70
A more tragic illustration of how incomplete information on chemical risks can lead to counter-
productive actions is the 1991 cholera epidemic in Peru.7 1 Based on the EPA studies showing the potential for a
slight increase in cancer risk from trihalomethanes, a chlorination byproduct, local water officials in Lima
stopped chlorinating the city's drinking water. The result was a cholera epidemic that claimed over 3,500
lives in 1991 alone.
The EPA also cites as a benefit to TRI the fact that the stock value of certain companies fell upon the
release of their TRI data. Whether this should be classified as a benefit or a cost of TRI depends on whether
the TRI information led to a more or less accurate picture of the companies' true value.7 5 Most likely, the
shareholders of those companies would not consider a decline in the value of their investment a "benefit."
The EPA also suggests that TRI offers benefits to regulated industries themselves by revealing
information that encourages changes in processes and reduces costs.76 However, nothing in economic theory
would support the notion that mandating the public release of private information would offer the provider of
the information any opportunities to increase efficiency and lower costs that it did not already have. On the
contrary. while it is certainly possible that. driven by the information release, companies have greater incentives
to reduce TRI chemicals. this does not imply a less costly, or even less risky, process. Contrary to what the
66 In addition, the scale economies in information generation and dissemination can lead to natural monopoly problems which convey
high levels of market power on information intermediaries. Beales et al., supra note 36, at 505.
6 -Media and advocacy groups often highlight the worst case scenarios, which tend to intensify the kinds of biases [in weighting high
risk information more heavily than is rational] observed here [in his interactive computer survey]." Viscusi, supra note 33, at 1669.
68 Kenneth Smith & Jack Raso. An Unhappy Anniversary: The Alar 'Scare' Ten Years Later (Feb. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.chem.ucsb.edu/~Iaverman/Cheml01/PDF/Alar2.PDF. Alar was developed in the 1960's to slow plant growth. Id. In
1989 its primary use was to prevent pre-harvest rotting of apples and cherries. Id. Despite relying on flawed studies, several groups,
including 60 AMinutes. provoked public fear of Alar as a carcinogen. Id. As a result, apple orchards and apple processors lost over 375
million dollars. Id. The loss hit the entire apple market, even though at the time only 15 percent of the apple trees in the United States
had been treated with Alar. /I.
i.
Christopher Anderson. Cholera Epidemic Traced to Risk Miscalculation, 354 NATURE 255 (Nov. 28, 1991). In January 1991, more
than 300.000 cases of cholera were reported in Peru and surrounding countries. Id. Experts found the outbreak was due to Peruvian




Economic Analysis. supra note 62, at 6-12. See also EPA Office of Information of Analysis and Access, How Are the Toxics
Release Inventory Data Used?, EPA-260-R-002-004, at 15 (May 2003) [hereinafter TRI Data], available at
http:/'www.epa.gov/tri/guidedocs/2003_datausepaper.pdf.
5 Since "releases" usually reflect responsible management of chemicals (legal disposal or recycling), declines in stock market value
may suggest a misunderstanding of the environmental hazard posed. See Alexander Volokh, The Pitfalls of Environmental Right-to-
Know. 2 UTAH L. REV. 805. 806 (2002). One such example is when steel company that reported releasing over 2 million pounds of a
TRI chemical. which in fact was used by the local sewage authority, saved $300,000 per year in chemical treatment costs. Id. at 830-
31.
76 TR I Data. supra note 74. at 9- 10.
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EPA suggests. the fact that companies undertook discharge reductions voluntarily in response to TRI does not
77mean that they reflected cost savings to the company or other social benefits to communities or consumers.
Moreover, the EPA's requirement that recycling of TRI chemicals be reported as "releases" likely discourages
incentives to recycle and reuse chemicals. 78
The EPA cites several examples where. in response to the release of TRI data, unions negotiated with
companies during contract discussions to reduce a facility's use and release of TRI chemicals.79 However, this
cannot be assumed to be a benefit to the company. the union employees, the surrounding community, or
consumers of the goods and services provided by the facility without information on the risk those chemicals
posed and the opportunity cost of those agreements. For example. perhaps instead the union could have
negotiated a more comprehensive health and benefits package. or higher wages. which would have improved
health and welfare more than the reduction in chemicals at the facility.s0 The positive correlation between
income and health has long been recognized: not only are life expectancies longer and health better in wealthier
nations. but wealthier individuals within nations tend to be healthier and live longer. 8 1 Recent empirical studies
have attempted to calculate this relationship quantitatively.8 2 They reveal that every $15 million in regulatory
costs. by reducing disposal income. results in one additional statistical death. Given this significant effect, as
well as other health-health tradeoffs. it is not sufficient to conclude that the reduction in TRI chemicals
triggered by the release of the data had a net positive impact on health or welfare.
2. 11 hat are the costs of TRI?
The EP3A estimates that facilities subject to reporting under the TRI spend 2,432,892 hours each year
collecting and reporting the information required in Form R. The EPA estimates that the costs to reporting
facilities exceeds $1 11 million per year. In addition to these costs. the EPA bears costs associated with data
processing. outreach. and enforcement. Based on estimates that the EPA prepared for the PBT rule, these EPA
costs may add roughly $9 million more per year.";
In comments to the EPA. the Small Business Administration estimates the direct cost to businesses of
complying with the TRI to be more than $300 million per year. It suggests that in addition to these direct
Public perception. whether founded in real risks or not. could drive companies to change processes. If not based on a risk-benefit
tradeoff. such changes could increase costs to consumers or. if a company chose to shift to a more risky non-TRI chemical, it could
actualli increase risks.
8 The TRI database does not distinguish between chemicals that are discharged to the environment and those that are recycled, so
responsibl\ recycled chemicals can be reported to the public as -toxic waste ... thrown into the environment." Volokh, supra note 75,
at 833. See also i. at 833 n. 144.
Economic Analysis. supra note 62. at 6-20.
" Information that focuses on certain factors (such as toxic chemical releases) can lead people to infer that other workplace issues
(such as health benefits or salary) are less important to their health and safety. "Unless such inferences are correct, the scoring system
may be used as an inappropriate signal." thus distorting the market. Beales et al.. supra note 36, at 525.
BRt\0 S. FREiY & Al.ois SntT/R. HAP1PINtss 110) EcoNoMics 81 (Princeton Univ. Press 2002).
See. e.g.. Randall Lutter et al.. The Cosi-Per-Life-Saved Cutofffbr Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 EcON. INQUIRY 599 (1999).
/J. at 599.
EPA. Toxic Chemical Release Reporting. OMB No. 2070-0093. at 84 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter Release Reporting], available at
http:"tvi.epa.gov'tri-lawsandregs ICR SS 1363_13.pdf.
5 The EPA estimated the private cost of the PBT rule at $147 million in 2000. the first year that reports are required, and $81.6
million in subsequent years. These costs comprise the cost to industry of(S145 million in the first year and $80 million in subsequent
years) and costs to ($2.0 million in the first year and $1.6 million in subsequent years). Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT)
Chemicals. 64 Fed. Reg. 58.666. 58.741 (Oct. 29. 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
SBA Office of Advocacy. Proposed Reforms to the Toxics Release Inventory Program: Streamlining Reporting and Preserving Data
integrity. Prepared by Jack Faucett Associates. at I (April 2004) [hereinafter SBA Report], available at
http:. 'tviwiv.sba.gov'advo'lais coiieiits tri2004.pdf.
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compliance costs, "facilities bear substantial indirect costs from -piggyback" requirements associated with a TRI
listing," such as federal storm water regulations and state taxes and pollution prevention programs. 7
These paperwork burdens and their associated costs are large. particularly for an action to which the
EPA attributes no direct benefits. (The benefits attributed to the TRI will only be gained from subsequent
activities, which would also involve additional costs.) However, they are not a complete estimate of the true
social cost of the information collection mandate. First. they exclude the cost of complying with state, local.
and federal requirements that are triggered when a chemical is placed on the TRI." A 1994 study of the EPA's
proposed rule to expand the TRI estimated that the overall cost of these requirements could be as much as six
times EPA's estimate.89 Furthermore., an estimate of the full social cost of the requirement must consider: the
opportunity cost of the collection, any social costs due to actions based on inaccurate: incomplete. or misleading
information; the disincentives for recycling created by the requirement that recycled chemicals be reported as
released; and the social costs associated with misuse of the information. including industrial espionage and
terrorist threats.90
The Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration also notes that -[a] significant number of
reports filed each year (as many as 60 percent for some chemicals) show zero to very small amounts of
chemical waste." 91 It suggests changes to the reporting procedures that could reduce the costs of the TRI
reporting without compromising benefits.92
The time and money required to compile and report on the release of certain chemicals diverts resources
from other activities, some of which may be more effective at protecting health and the environment. The
literature on information disclosure in product markets offers interesting insights on this issue.93 Requiring the
disclosure of information on certain product attributes can shift competition among sellers into those attributes.
and away from undisclosed attributes. potentially causing distortions in the product market. For TRI
disclosures, this distortion can result when the release of information encourages facilities to take actions to
reduce their use or release of certain chemicals at the expense of other actions that may be more effective at
protecting health and the environment, or at achieving other social goals. As noted in the discussion of benefits.
above, all of the qualitative benefits the EPA attributes to the TRI also involve additional costs which may. in
fact, have the effect of imposing additional net costs on citizens and consumers. To the extent the information
reported is inaccurate or used to mislead people about threats to their health or well-being. it is very likely to
result in actions that are not warranted by objective risk analysis and which divert scarce resources from actions
that actually could reduce health risks and environmental harm.
" Id. at 8-9.
8 See generally Release Reporting. supra note 84.
89 SBA Report, supra note 86, at 9 (citing Price Associates. Critique of 1SEPA s Reguluoiery Ipac.t AInatsis of the Proposed Rule to
Add Certain Chemicals to the Toxics Release Inventory (May 2. 1994)). This study found that the most significant programs triggered
by a TRI listing were: the federal storm water permit program. the federal procurement requirement that agencies reduce their
purchases of products containing TRI chemicals. and various state requirements to develop and implement pollution prevention
programs for TRI chemicals. Id.
Alexander Volokh, et al.. supra note 45.
91 Small Business Administration (*"SBA*") Office of Advocacy. Advocacy Urges EPA to Reduce Small Business Reporting Burdens
under the Toxic Release Inventory. available at http:. 'www.sba.gov'advollaws'comments'factsepa03_0902.pdf (last visited Nov. 4.
2004). This occurs because reporting is triggered based on the quantity of a chemical present at the facility. not the quantity released.
Id.
92 Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Alternate Threshold for Low% Annual Reportable Amounts: Request for Comment on Renewal
Information Collection, 68 Fed. Reg. 39.071 (proposed July 1. 2003).
9 See, e.g., Beales et al., supra note 36. at 507-13.
Volokh, et al., supra note 45.
9 See generally HENRY I. MILLER & GREcORY Co\Ko. THt FRANKI \t400 MYtM: How PROTEST AND PLItrics THREATEN THE
BIOTECH REVOLUTION (Praeger 2004). Fear of kernels of genetically modified corn donated by the United States lead the
government of Zambia to keep the corn from its starving population. with President Levy Mwanawasa declaring, "We would rather
10
MELPR, Vol. 12, No. I
Also missing from the EPA's cost estimates are costs associated with the distribution of private
information.96 Wide release of private business information makes it available, not only to communities and
governments, but also to competitors, potential saboteurs, and even terrorists. 97 As Professor Mary J. Culnan. a
member of President Clinton's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection observed:
Once information gets on the Internet it can be manipulated in ways that were previously unfeasible
and there is little accountability for how it is used. The more information that is made available, the
more likely it will be used in ways that have nothing to do with the original reasons for collecting
it.98
The EPA argues that benefits of reporting will accrue to citizens. public interest groups. government
agencies, and facilities themselves. 99 It should also recognize that benefits will also accrue to competitors. both
national and international, as well as to terrorists seeking targets for chemical sabotage.
B. The Goals of TRI
In its final regulation lowering reporting thresholds for PBT chemicals, the EPA dismissed commenters'
suggestions that potential health risks be a factor in the EPA decisions to list chemicals or set reporting
thresholds. 00 Arguing that the potential risks of the chemicals in question are not relevant, the Agency insisted
that its only obligation is to collect and disseminate information about releases, so as to empower communities
to mqke informed decisions. It suggests that this public "report card" will inform communities and encourage
businesses to pursue pollution prevention efforts. However, a review of TRI's record reveals that it falls short
of even these goals.
1. Does TRI provide communities useful information?
Even if the information reported by TRI were accurate, the inventory may be misleading because it
provides no insight into the different toxicities of the listed chemicals or the potential for exposure to them. A
reviewer of the TRI data cannot easily ascertain whether the "release" reflects responsible management and
recycling, emissions allowed by regulation, or accidental spills. The inventory certainly offers no insight into
whether the benefits of a chemical outweigh the potential risks due to exposure. Thus. even if the quality of the
TRI data was high, data on quantities of certain chemicals, without any insight into the risks they may pose.
may serve to misinform and mislead communities about potential health and environmental risks.
starve than get something toxic." Henry 1. Miller & Gregory Conko. A Dead/v Food Fight. 2 HooviER DIGEST (2003). available at
http://www.hooverdigest.org/032/millerh.html.
9See Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals. 64 Fed. Reg. 58.666. 58.741 (Oct. 29. 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
372).
9 Logomasini, supra note 61.
9 William H. Lash Ill, Giving Away the Store: The Fhavs in EPA s Expanded Right to Know Program. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS, No. 92 (Aug. 1998). available at
http://www.maurizioturco.it/echelon/banca dati/CSAB%20Center/o20for/o20the%20Study%200oP/o2OAmerican%2OBusiness/Giving
%20Away%2the%20Store.htm#REFMADE33 (quoting Mary J. Culnan. JVhat Is Plain to See .... WASh. PosT. July 13. 1997. at
DI).
9 Economic Analysis, supra note 62, at 6-11.
'* Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals. 64 Fed. Reg. at 58.687-58.695.
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Furthermore. a review of available data on the quality of the information in the TRI database sheds
doubt on its reliability. even as a simple inventory of pounds of chemicals released. As Tietenberg and Wheeler
observe.
Information has both a quantity and quality dimension. Effective risk communication requires that the
requisite information be reliable, as well as available. Inaccurate or partial information can be worse than
no information at all, if it promotes either a false sense of security or unjustified fears. 101
Since TRI data are self-reported and not checked for accuracy on an ongoing basis, it is difficult to
determine the accuracy of the inventory. However, two EPA studies. one of the 1987 reporting year,102 and one
of the 1994 and 1995 reporting years.' 0 attempted to check the accuracy of reported releases at a sample of
facilities. These studies reveal that a significant fraction of reported releases exhibit large errors. The 1990
report found that 16 percent of the releases reported in the 1987 database were off by more than a factor of ten,
and 23 percent were off by more than a factor of two.10 4 Despite these large errors in individual reporting, the
direction of the errors tended to offset one another, allowing the EPA to conclude that the data were
"surprisingly accurate in the aggregate.- 10  The 1998 report, while not as clearly presented, reveals that the
accuracy of the TRI data has not improved significantly since 1987.106
The inaccuracy of the reported releases is not surprising. There are fundamental limits to how accurate
release estimates can be. For example. to estimate non-stack air emissions at a mid-sized facility, one would
have to consider hundreds or thousands of valves, flanges, and other release points. 0 7 Congress specified that
no additional monitoring or measurement could be required for the purpose of reporting to TRI. os Thus, even
the site-surveyed figures, used to estimate the quality of the data in the 1990 and 1998 EPA reports, are
themselves only estimates and may not accurately reflect actual releases.
There are other problems with the TRI database. EPA studies reveal that the location data in the EPA-
published TRI database contain significant errors.109 Almost 3 percent of TRI latitudes and longitudes place the
Tietenberg & Wheeler. supra note 49. at II (emphasis added).
102 See Press Release. EPA. 1988 Toxic Release Inventory National Report Available (Oct. 3, 1990), available at
http://www.epa.gov/history/org/tri/02.htm.
103 See EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. 1994 and 1995 TRI Data Quality Report, EPA 745-R-98-002, at i (Mar. 1998)[hereinafter 1994-95 Report]. available at http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/data quality reports/1995/toc-ovr.pdf.
" EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. 1998 TRI Data Quality Report (1990). Most of these errors in reported non-zero
releases reflected over-reporting of the release. Id.
h. (emphasis in original). A major goal of the TRI is to correct market failures associated with incomplete information about
chemical hazards in communities. 1994-95 Report, supra note 103, at i. Information that is accurate in the aggregate, but not at the
local level. not only does not address this market failure; it can create new externalities by incorrectly identifying areas as hazardous
that are not. and vice versa.
"'6 The comments of The Mercatus Center's Regulatory Studies Program on the proposed PBT rule discusses the findings of these
reports in more detail. See Susan Dudley, Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) (Apr. 1, 2004), available at
www.mercatus.org/regulatorystudies/article.php/736.html and Susan Dudley, TRI Reporting of Lead and Lead Compounds (Dec. 15,
1999). available at www.mercatus.org/regulatorystudies/article.phpl747.html.
'' Nick Hanley, et al., INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL EcONOMIcs 293 (Oxford Press 2001).108 The EPA provides instructions for completing Part 11 of the Form. See EPA Office of Information, Toxic Chemical Release
Inventory Reporting Forms and Instructions, EPA 745-B-01-001 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://vww.epa.gov/tri/report/rfi2000mar 1901 .pdf (last updated Mar. 19. 2001).
0 See, e.g. National Library of Medicine, How Accurate Are TRI Locations in TOXMAP?, available at
http://toxmap.aquilent.com/toxmap/helpcoordinateAccuracyjsp (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) and 1994-95 Report, supra note 103, at i.
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facilities in the wrong county. and 0.75 percent of the facilities are reported to be in the wrong state. 0 EPA
analysis of exposure to toxic chemicals in Brooklyn. NY found that about half of TRI latitude/longitude
coordinates were good to within 150 meters or better. but that over 15 percent (out of a sample of eighty-seven
facilities) were wrong by at least one kilometer. with one being misplaced from its actual location by almost
seven kilometers.'
Not only are reported releases from a facility in a given year unreliable, but changes in emissions from a
facility from one year to the next may not reflect actual reductions or increases in releases. The EPA suggests
that '"inter-temporal and inter-facility data provided by TRlI provide unique information on "when facility ...
releases are increasing over time. Howvever. the EPA found that year-to-year changes in estimated releases
at facilities are more likely to reflect estimation technique changes and other factors than physical, engineering
and production changes. -Estimation technique changes- and -other factors" accounted for 82 percent of the
increases reported between 1989 and 1990. and 67 percent of the 1989 to 1990 decreases.1 14
The EPA identifies one purpose of the TRI as *providing a complete profile of toxic chemical releases
and other waste management acti\ities."'1 Yet. the profile is hardly complete. The EPA's 1997 National Air
Quality and Emissions Trends Report reveals that the TRI data alone represent less than 9 percent (760,000 tons
per year) of the total 8.1 million tons of air toxics released in 1993.6 It concludes that "the TRI's lack of
emission estimates from mobile and area sources" as well as "other significant limitations," "severely limit its
utility as a comprehensive air toxics emissions database."
In sum. the EPA's 1990 and 1998 reviewxs of the TRI data quality suggest that. while in the aggregate,
the TRI reflects the number of pounds of listed chemicals released. releases reported on a facility basis may
contain large errors that make them unreliable for site-specific analysis. Furthermore, the EPA has recognized
significant limitations associated with even the aggregate numbers. which severely limit the TRI's utility as a
comprehensive database.
- Does ii Prevent Pollution?
The EPA views TRI as a public -'report card"'" for the industrial community, creating a powerful
motivation Ior waste reduction. noting that. with the enactment of the Pollution Prevention Act, "businesses and
neighboring communities can build on emerging pollution prevention practices for everyone's benefit." 119
Other advocates and users of TRI stress *pollution prevention" as the ultimate purpose of the database. For
Talcott. et al.. Ifho /h ;ha Theres. Presented at the Air & Waste Management Association Meeting (Dec. 8, 1998) (on file with
author).
I d.
Economic Anal% sis. supru note 62. at 1-19.
Volokh.supra note 75. at 805.
' EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. 1991 TRI Public Data Release Report. EPA 745-R-93-003, at 163 (May 1993)
[hereinafter 1991 Report]. The example of holy ammonia releases were reported illustrates this problem. In 1989, EPA changed its
guidance to require facilities to report the quantity of ammonia contained in ammonium sulfate rather than the quantity of ammonium
sulfate released. Volokh. supra note 75. at 817. This change in guidance caused the reported quantities of ammonium sulfate released
to decline by 586.7 million pounds. when, in fact. net ammonia releases increased by an estimated 40 million pounds. Id. at 818.
"5 Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals. 64 Fed. Reg. 688. 690 (proposed Jan. 5, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
372). available at http:'//www.epa.gov'fedrgstr'EPA-TRI/1999/Januarv/Day-05/tri34835.htm.
11 EPA. National Air Quality and Emissions Trends Report 74 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Trends Report], available at
http: /ww"".epa.gov'oar'airtrends'aqtrnd97'chapter5.pdf.
i. See also id. at 83. n.4.
11 EPA. What is the Taxics Release Invenioi-r. at 2. available at http://'www.unitar.org/cwm/prtr/pdf/cat2/tri general.pdf (last revised
Feb. 28. 2000).
h"i . at 3.
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example, Friends of the Earth observes. "the true role of a chemical inventory is to stimulate pollution
prevention and waste reduction programs." 120 According to the EPA. from 1988 to 2002. manufacturing
facilities decreased their on- and off-site disposal or other releases by 49 percent.**"' However. given the
inaccuracies in the database discussed above. it is not clear how much confidence we should place in these
figures.
Assuming these statistics are accurate. however, they do not tell us the extent to which toxic emission
reductions over the last decade are attributable to TRI versus other actions. As a Reason Foundation study
observes, the use of industrial chemicals. including those on the TRI. has been declining relative to total output
for several decades (before the introduction of the TRI): In the 1960s. each 1 percent of GDP growth increased
the demand for industrial chemicals by 2.9 percent: this ratio fell to 1.5 percent in the 1970s. 1.0 percent in the
1980s, and 0.7 percent in the 1990s.122
The study attributes this in part to a decline in "heavy industries that are big chemical users
(automobiles, steel, housing) ... relative to more-sophisticated and less-chemical-intensive industries and as
global competition increases."' 2 3 The numerous air. water and waste regulations that have been implemented
over the last decade have also contributed to the decline in emissions.124 For example. implementation of
maximum achievable control technology (MACT) standards. as required by the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, is estimated to have decreased air toxics emissions by 660.000 tons between 1993 and 1997.1m and
another 1.5 million tons per year over the next ten years.1
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO\I\E\D.\ IONS
A. Conclusions
The EPA continues to expand the TRI without addressing the fundamental questions of whal
information will enhance the public's understanding of the risks they face. how much of it should be released.
and to whom. Toxic releases, as defined under the TRI. are not equivalent to health or environmental hazards.
so data on the pounds of chemicals released. as provided by TRI. fail to proxide communities relevant data on
risks that may be present.127 As the Small Business Administration cautions.
data users could mistakenly conclude that -total production-related wastes" [as reported in the TRI] are
entirely transmitted into environmental media and overlook the fact that this figure includes quantities
treated, recycled, and consumed in energy recovery. Community members may also focus
disproportionately on relative quantities of the wastes. not on the chemicals" varying risks.128
120 Mary Taylor, Toxics in Your Bac/gard. Your Right to Know% about Industrial Pollution - a Case Stul at Avonmouth (Mar. 25.
1997), available at http://www.foe.co.uk/pubsinfo brietings'html'l9971215145345.htmil.
2 EPA, 2002 TRI Public Data Release Report. EPA 260-R-04-003. at 4 (Jun. 2004). available at
http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/tri02/pdr/tri brochure.pdf.
122 Volokh, et al.. supra note 63.
123 Id.
124 For example, regulations issued pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. the Toxic Substances Control Act. the Clean
Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act.
125 1997 Trends Report, supra note I 16. at 75.
126 Id. at 80.
127 Though EPA's mission is to protect human health and the environment. EPA. 2003-2008 EPA SrRAnrIC PLAN 2 (Sept. 30,
2003), its TRI rulemakings have rejected risk-based approaches that would pro% ide information on risks to human health and the
environment, in favor of information on pounds of chemicals. Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals. 64 Fed. Reg.
58,666, 58,692-95 (Oct. 29. 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
128 SBA Report, supra note 86., at 10.
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Not only has the TRI information not been demonstrated to be relevant for measuring risks to health or
the environment, it is neither accurate nor comprehensive. The EPA quality reviews suggest that, while in the
aggregate, the TRI reflects the number of pounds of listed chemicals released; releases reported on a facility
basis may contain large errors that make them unreliable for site-specific analysis. Furthermore, the EPA has
recognized significant limitations associated with even the aggregate numbers, which severely limit the TRfs
utility as a comprehensive database. While the EPA and others may have been successful at providing easy
access to TRI data, there is no evidence that it has been successful at informing consumers and citizens of real
health or environmental threats.
The EPA has not supported its recent regulations reducing reporting thresholds for certain PBT
chemicals and lead compounds with available data. Despite extensive information available to the EPA on
these chemicals, the reporting thresholds are not based on any quantitative analysis of the magnitude of releases
that will be captured, nor the potential hazard posed by releases at different thresholds.
Information is a good, and like other goods, it is costly to produce.' 2 9  More information is not
necessarily more valuable, or more relevant to communities.1 30 To avoid tragedies such as the cholera epidemic
that ensued when officials in Lima, Peru heeded the EPA's warnings about the potential carcinogenicity of
chlorination byproducts,13' the EPA should take its responsibility for informing, but not alarming. communities
seriously.
The EPA estimates that the data collection and reporting costs of complying with the TRI alone are over
$100 million each year, and others suggest the costs are three times that.' 32 Yet, the EPA does not present any
direct benefits of the TRI or the recent expansion in reporting requirements; instead the EPA justifies its rules
qualitatively on the grounds that the new requirements will increase available information and facilitate further
regulation of toxic chemicals. However, this overlooks the fact that for several of the key chemicals subject to
these rules, extensive release data have already been compiled. 1 The EPA does not justify the need for
additional, arguably less accurate, release information from TRI. Recent rulemakings lowering the threshold
for reporting have required a significant number of reports to be filed that show zero to very small amounts of
chemical waste released.134
B. Recommendations
The TRI has been in place now for seventeen years. The EPA has sufficient information to take stock of
what it has achieved and evaluate ways to make it more effective at providing communities with relevant
information to enable them to protect their health and the environment. The recent PBT and lead rules do not
appear to have benefited from the experience of the last seventeen years. nor from information made available
through various other agency efforts to reduce health and environmental risks from toxic chemicals.
129 Volokh, et al., supra note 63.
I30 See Viscusi, supra note 33, at 1657.
131 Anderson, supra note 73, at 255.
132 SBA Report, supra note 86, at 8.
133 The Emergency Response Notification System ("ERNS") contains release information that is required under several federal
statutes including CERCLA, EPCRA, the Hazardous Material Transportation Act of 1974 (HMTA). and the CWA. See ERNS.
available at http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/index.html (last visited Nov. 4. 2004). The EPA's 1997 National Air Quality and Emissions
Trends Report reveals that the TRI data alone represent less than 9 percent (760.000 tons per year) of the total 8.1 million tons of air
toxics released in 1993. 1997 Trends Report, supra note 116. at 74.
134 SBA Office of Advocacy. supra note 91.
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The EPA should stop increasing the scope of chemicals covered by the TRI and should certainly not
expand the program to require reporting of chemical processes within plants unless and until these changes are
shown to produce net benefits in terms of human health and the environment.
Particularly now, the EPA owes it to the public to take an honest look at the value and the social cost of
the data that are being reported under TRI. The mere act of making vast amounts of data on chemical quantities
available to the public should not be assumed to provide value without a careful examination of whether reliable
and meaningful information is being conveyed about health and environmental risk. The EPA may find that
less data. targeted at higher risk chemicals and facilities, would provide more useful information than more data
on more chemicals. The statute requires the EPA to make decisions regarding reporting frequency based on
"experience from previously submitted toxic chemical release forms" and the extent to which the information
has been used.' It also suggests that the EPA consider the burden on reporting facilities. 6
The EPA's experience from previously submitted toxic chemical release forms has revealed that year-to-
year changes in estimated releases at facilities are more likely to reflect "estimation technique changes" and
'other factors" than physical. engineering and production changes.'37 "Estimation technique changes" and
'other factors" accounted for 82 percent of the increases reported between 1989 and 1990, and 67 percent of the
1989 to 1990 decreases.138 As a result, reducing the frequency of reporting should not change the value of the
information available to potential users. Of course, the EPA's experience with TRI would allow it to tailor
reporting frequency to the attributes of different facilities and chemicals. For example, it might find that the
value of the information provided would not be adversely affected (and might even be improved) if it reduced
reporting frequency for all but newly-reporting facilities, facilities that have had major changes, or facilities that
comprise the majority of releases.1 9 It could also tailor reporting frequency to characteristics of the chemical.
For example. the Small Business Administration recommended that PBT reporting be required "only every
three to five years," noting that "because PBTs are trace elements in processes that are integral to industrial
manufacturing. PBT emissions are unlikely to change significantly from year to year." 40
The EPA has conducted two data quality reviews of TRI reporting, which suggested significant errors in
reported releases. They also reveal that, despite the extensive outreach, guidance documents, built-in error
checking. and electronic reporting that have evolved since 1987, the reporting accuracy has not improved. The
EPA should extend this examination to determine whether reports are more accurate for larger facilities or
larger releases. If so. modifying thresholds to capture large releases from large facilities might actually improve
the quality of the inventory.
42 U.S.C. § I 1023(i)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
% Id.
1991 Report. supra note 114. at 163.
Id.
The SBA recommended in April 2004 changes to the reporting requirements which it estimates "have the potential to save facilities
tens of millions of dollars every year in reporting and other regulatory costs while having minimal effect on the quality of TRI data."
SBA Report, supra note 86. at 2.
140 Memorandum from the SBA Office of Advocacy, to Jere Glover, EPA Chief Counsel, SBA Recommendation on Draft TRI PBT
Rule (Dec. 8. 1998). available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/tri.htmi.
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